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ABSTRACT

This Article presents two new arguments against "discounting"
future human lives during cost-benefit analysis, arguing that even
absent ethical objections to the disparate treatment of present and
future humanity, the economic calculations of cost-benefit analysis
itself-if properly performed-counsel against discounting lives at
anything close to current rates. In other words, even if society sets
aside all concerns with the discounting of future generations in
principle, current discounting of future human lives cannot be
justified even on the discounters' own terms. First, because costbenefit analysis has thus far ignored evidence of rising health care
expenditures, it underestimates the "willingness to pay" for health and
safety that future citizens will likely exhibit, thereby undervaluing
Second, cost-benefit analysis ignores the trend of
their lives.
improved material conditions in developed countries. As time
advances, residents of rich countries tend to live better and spend
more, meaning that a strict economic monetization of future persons
values the lives of our expected descendents above those of present
citizens. These two factors justify "inflation" of future lives that
would offset, perhaps completely, the discount rate used. for human
life. Until regulators correct their method of discounting the benefits
of saving human lives in the future, the United States will continue to
suffer the fatal costs of underregulation, and agencies will remain in
violation of legal requirements to maximize net benefits.
INTRODUCTION

is
a sensible and effective regulation
When
nderregulation
implemented, society loses whatever
then not
but kills.
proposed
benefits the regulation would have provided. When those benefits
take the form of saved lives-if, for example, the regulation would
have kept a certain carcinogen out of the workplace-failing to enact
and enforce a regulation means people die. For at least two reasons,

U
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federal agencies in the United States systematically undercount the
benefits of regulation, causing regulators to forsake the
implementation of lifesaving laws that would have been enacted were
benefits estimated more accurately. The result is countless American
lives lost every year.
This Article presents two new arguments against the "discounting"
of future human lives as part of cost-benefit analysis (CBA), arguing
that even absent ethical objections to the disparate treatment of
present and future humanity, the economic calculations of costbenefit analysis itself-if properly performed--counsel against
discounting lives. In other words, even if society sets aside all
concerns with the discounting of future generations in principle, the
current practice of discounting future human lives cannot be justified
even on the discounters' own terms. First, because cost-benefit
analysis has thus far ignored evidence of rising health care
expenditures, it underestimates the "willingness to pay" for health and
safety that future citizens will likely exhibit, thereby undervaluing
their lives. Second, cost-benefit analysis ignores the trend of
improved material conditions in developed countries. As time
advances, residents of rich countries tend to live better and spend
more, meaning that a strict economic evaluation of future lives would
discount the relatively impoverished lives of present citizens
compared to the projected luxurious and healthy existence of our
expected descendents.
Because all federal regulatory agencies calculate costs and benefits,
the underregulation resulting from overdiscounting deprives
Americans of benefits in several diverse ways. By undercounting the
benefits of environmental protection, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) deprives Americans of clean air and clean water. By
undercounting the benefits of workplace safety, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) exposes Americans to
health hazards. By undercounting the benefits of automobile accident
prevention, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
increases the number of fatal crashes. Examples are limited only by
the number of federal agencies and the scope of their regulatory
Regulations
mandate, meaning there is effectively no limit.
would be
of
which
the
benefits
concerning global climate change,
realized far into the future, are especially impeded by
II use the word "countless" advisedly; the number of needless deaths literally cannot be
counted with any reliability.
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Until regulators correct their method for
overdiscounting.
discounting the benefits of saving human lives in the future, the
United States will continue to suffer the fatal costs of underregulation,
and agencies will remain in violation of. legal requirements to
maximize net benefits.
I
How PRESENT LIVES ARE VALUED, AND THE PROBLEM OF
DISCOUNTING

When deciding whether and how to regulate, federal agencies
evaluate the costs and benefits of proposed regulatory strategies,
2
comparing one strategy against another and against doing nothing.
Because the purpose of regulation is often to save lives--or at least to
reduce risks to life-the benefits of many potential policies cannot be
quantified without setting a value on human life. For example,
imagine a potential Department of Transportation (DOT) regulation
providing that any city receiving federal highway construction funds
must employ a specified number of school crossing guards to prevent
students from being struck by cars.3 The costs of the regulations,
while uncertain, could be estimated with some pretense of accuracy.
How many crossing guards do recipient cities employ today? How
much would each additional guard's salary, fringe benefits, and
overhead cost? Although some estimation will be necessary, a
plausible number can be offered. For this exercise, assume extra
crossing guards cost a total of $100 million yearly. The benefits of
extra guards, however, defy straightforward quantification. Even if
the sole benefit is the prevention of fatal car accidents,4 the magnitude
2 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprintedas amended in 5 U.S.C. §
601 (requiring that agencies conduct cost-benefit analysis before promulgating major

regulation). See generally Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricingthe Priceless:
Cost-BenefitAnalysis of EnvironmentalProtection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2002).
3 Although I have not found such a crossing-guard mandate, DOT regulations
concerning local school crossing guards do exist. See, e.g., National Standards for Traffic
Control Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 268, 273 (Jan. 2, 2008) (discussing Federal Highway
Administration standards for "STOP paddles used by adult crossing guards");
Amendments to Highway Safety Program Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 14,843, 14,857 (Apr.
1, 2009) ("Local school officials and law enforcement personnel should work together to
establish crossing guard programs."); see also 32 C.F.R. § 634.24(b)(3) (2009) (directing
Army "installation commanders" to develop traffic circulation plans that should "includ[e]
trained school-crossing guards").
4 One would expect additional benefits; the crossing guards may prevent non-fatal
accidents, reduce street crime, provide lost motorists with directions, and perform other
useful services.
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of the benefit remains unknowable-or at least not capable of being
weighed against the $100 million cost-unless the policy maker
ascribes a monetary value to each life saved. If the extra guards
would save twenty lives annually, then the value of the benefits
exceeds the value of the costs only if each life saved is valued above
$5 million.
Is it worth $5 million dollars to save a schoolchild from being
killed by a speeding car? At some level, the question is preposterous,
unanswerable. But both cost-benefit analysis and the laws requiring
that it be performed demand a number. To calculate the value of a
human life-sometimes called the "value of a statistical life"
(VSL)-economists have attempted to determine how persons value
the elimination of risks of death. For example, if a person would pay
x dollars to avoid a one-in-a-hundred chance of instant death, then the
person values his own life at 100-times-x dollars. To determine a
person's "willingness to pay" (WTP) to avoid risk, one can simply
ask (i.e., collect survey data), or one can extrapolate willingness to
pay based on real-world phenomena, such as wage premiums for
dangerous jobs.5 If two jobs are otherwise identical but one presents
a one-in-a-thousand risk of death each year for every worker, then
6
employees at the dangerous job should demand higher compensation.
An annual wage premium of $8000 would imply that workers are
willing to accept the risk in exchange for that amount (or that workers
at the safe job are willing to pay $8000 to avoid the risk), leading to
a statistical life valued at $8 million.8
5 See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the
DiscountingofHuman Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 955-57 (1999).
6 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE
1912 (1993). The workers "should" demand higher compensation in a world wherein
certain assumptions of economists, such as workers possessing accurate information about
wages and risks at their own and other workplaces, are true. The validity of such
assumptions is a question beyond the scope of this work.
7 For purposes of this Article, the difference between calculations relying on
"willingness to pay" (WTP) and "willingness to accept" (WTA) is not especially
important. The key is that, one way or another, economists can determine a VSL based on
wage premiums and other market phenomena. For more detail on the distinction between
WTP and WTA, as well as the potential relevance of so-called "endowment effects" in
deciding which is more useful, see Scott A. Moss & Peter H. Huang, How the New
Economics Can Improve Employment Discrimination Law, and How Economics Can
Survive the Demise of the "Rational Actor," 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 183, 206-10
(2009); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Pleafor Disaggregation,54 DUKE L.J.

385, 400 (2004).
8 See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION (1993); Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Value ofLife, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 209
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In addition to calculating the values of costs and benefits,
regulators must consider when costs will be borne and when benefits
will be enjoyed. A benefit reaped today is normally worth more than
the same benefit tomorrow, and a cost incurred today normally hurts
more than the prospect of an identical future cost.9 This concept
explains why banks charge interest and why J. Wellington Wimpy so
often told Popeye, "I will gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger
today."' 0 Because many regulations impose up-front costs to achieve
future benefits," a cost-benefit analysis incorporates the "present
value" of future costs and benefits.12 So far, so good. Few would
dispute that a hamburger today is worth more than the promise of a
future hamburger, even if one is absolutely certain that the future
hamburger will be delivered as promised. Why is a hamburger today
better than a guaranteed future hamburger? The theory is that one
could sell the hamburger today, invest the proceeds, and then buy the
future hamburger later. If the investment beats inflation, one can
enjoy the future hamburger and extra cash. In practice, an investment
in U.S. Treasury bonds would likely provide at least some extra cash
at close to zero risk. Another reason hamburgers today are worth
more than guaranteed future hamburgers is that someone entitled to a
hamburger today has additional options. For example, if she is at the
brink of starvation, the hamburger today (or its cash value) could save
her life, and the promised hamburger will be worth nothing if she dies
before its delivery. Unless there exists a market for selling the rights
to future hamburgers, one entitled to a promised burger has a highly
illiquid asset. For all these reasons, regulators sensibly discount the
value of most future benefits.
(1990). Other data one might use to calculate VSLs include wrongful death verdicts, life
insurance purchases, and payments by the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.
9 See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 598 (5th ed. 2008); RICHARD
A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 14 (7th ed.
2003) ("[A] dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow, because the dollar today
can be invested to start earning interest immediately.").
10 See ELZIE CRISLER SEGAR, THIMBLE THEATER, INTRODUCING POPEYE: A
COMPLETE COMPILATION OF THE FIRST ADVENTURES OF POPEYE, 1928-1930 (1977).
11 A simple example: When the Environmental Protection Agency mandated the
reduction of lead in automotive fuel, industry incurred up-front costs, and the benefits (a
reduction in lead poisoning) came later. See OFFICE OF POL'Y ANALYSIS, U.S. EPA,
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING LEAD IN GASOLINE: FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS 1-23 (1985) ("[W]e use a 10 percent real discount rate to compute present
values . . . . Generally, the higher the discount rate, the lower the net benefits, because
costs usually are incurred sooner than benefits.").
12 See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 1559-60.

HeinOnline -- 89 Or. L. Rev. 1318 2010-2011

2011]

Health Inflation, Wealth Inflation, and the DiscountingofHuman Life

1319

Controversy results from the combination of these two practicesthe valuation of statistical lives and the discounting of future benefits.
The problem is that while a hamburger available today is worth more
than a hamburger provided in the future, it is far less clear that a life
saved today is more valuable than a life saved a few years from now.
If one regulation can deliver x dollars immediately and another
regulation costing the same amount would take ten years to deliver
the same dollar amount, then the first regulation wins any cost-benefit
contest.13 But if one regulation saves a schoolchild today, and
another regulation costing the same amount would save a schoolchild
ten years from now,14 which regulation should be enacted?
A. The Status Quo
The consensus among policy makers is that the life saved today is
indeed worth more than the one saved in the future, and cost-benefit
analyses generally discount future VSLs just as they discount future
economic benefits.'s In a recent rule-making proposal, the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA) announced a plan to restrict mobile
telephone use by train operators.16 To justify the proposed rule, the
FRA produced a CBA as part of its regulatory impact analysis.' 7

13 Note that if the delay is sufficiently long (say, a generation or
becomes problematic even without monetization of human lives.
recklessly now will suffer the consequences in her own future, but
recklessly the patrimony of future generations suffer no such reckoning.

two), discounting
One who spends
persons spending
See sources cited

infra note 42; see also Coleman Bazelon & Kent Smetters, Discounting in the Long Term,
35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 277, 281 (2001); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 251-58 (rev.

ed. 1999).
14 The dichotomy contemplates two different children potentially saved, each the same
age at the time saved. For the same person, a risk (or certainty) of death now is worse than
that same risk (or certainty) ten years from now. Humans being mortal, efforts to avoid
fatalities (such as driving carefully or seeking medical attention for injuries) reflect a
desire to postpone-not to prevent-bearing the ultimate "cost" faced by us all.
15 See generally Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting ...

on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119

(2007) (objecting to current practice); Dexter Samida & David A. Weisbach, Paretian
Intergenerational Discounting, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 145, 145 (2007) (arguing that
"discounting future costs and benefits of projects [including lives] does not undervalue
future generations").
16 See Restrictions on Railroad Operating Employees' Use of Cellular Telephones and
Other Electronic Devices, 75 Fed. Reg. 27,672, 27,673 (May 18, 2010) (to be codified at
49 C.F.R. pt. 220) (proposing a rule that would replace an emergency temporary rule
currently in force).
17 Id. at 27,683. Because the regulation at issue is so straightforward and the benefits so
clear, this document offers a good starting point for readers relatively unfamiliar with
CBAs and the process of creating them.
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Costs included training railroad employees, as well as the
"opportunity costs" of additional time spent in safety briefings, which
employees could otherwise spend somewhere else.' 8 The FRA then
considered what benefits would be necessary to justify the costs. In
the agency's words, "FRA compared the costs of the proposed rule to
the minimum number of statistical fatalities that would need to be
prevented for the rule to be cost-beneficial.""
With the costs
measured in dollars, such a comparison was possible only if the FRA
assigned a monetary value to the prevention of "statistical fatalities."
Concluding that "the regulation would yield positive net benefits if it
prevented the loss of just half of the value of a statistical life each
year over the twenty-year period examined," 2 o which the agency
considered quite likely, 2 1 the FRA proposed that the regulation be
enacted. Perhaps because the benefits of preventing train operators
from chatting on mobile phones so obviously outweigh the costs of
the regulation, no explicit discussion of discounting saved lives
appears in the FRA's notice of proposed rulemaking. Regardless,
discounting is silently included in the agency's assessment of "the
value of a statistical life [saved] each year" for twenty years.
Explicit discounting of future saved lives appears in a proposed
rule concerning food labeling announced by the Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) of the Department of Agriculture. The rule
requires labels disclosing the percentage of fat in certain meat
products, including ground hamburger meat, where such labeling was
previously voluntary. 2 2 The rule would cost meat producers and
23
retailers hundreds of millions of dollars. The benefits would appear
in the form of improved health enjoyed by meat consumers caused by

18Id The FRA's conclusion about costs was that "[a]pplying highly conservative
assumptions, 20-year direct and indirect costs could total as much as $22.4 million
(discounted at 7%) or $30.2 million (discounted at 3%)." Id. at 27,674.
19 Id. at 27,684.
20 Id
21 Id. ("For some perspective on the achievability of such prevention, FRA notes that
over the period from 2000 to 2008, electronic device usage in trains likely caused or
contributed to accidents resulting in at least 30 fatalities and over 100 injuries-an average
of over three deaths per year, as well as significant train delay and property damages.").
22 Nutrition Labeling of Single-Ingredient Products and Ground or Chopped Meat and
Poultry Products, 74 Fed. Reg. 67,736, 67,739 (Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Nutrition
Labeling Rule] (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 317, 381).
23 Depending on the discount rate, FSIS estimated the present value of the costs
between $348 million and $472 million. Id at 67,773.
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24

greater access to nutritional information. FSIS estimated that after
the labeling rules have been in force for several years, the regulation
will save about 114.5 lives annually.2 5 Accordingly, like so many
regulations, the meat-labeling rule would have up-front costs and
distant benefits, making the discount rate an important factor in the
FSIS cost-benefit analysis. The higher the discount rate, the lower the
present value of the benefits, and the less likely the regulation will be
enacted. The value of a statistical life chosen by the agency will also
significantly affect the result, with a higher VSL leading to higher
benefit numbers. Here, FSIS calculated a range of expected benefits,
using VSLs from $5 million to $6.5 million and discount rates of 3%
and 7%.26 The vastly different outcomes starkly illustrate the
27
importance of the discount rate and VSL chosen by the agency.
With a VSL of $6.5 million and a discount rate of 3%, the total
benefits are estimated to equal $5.9 billion. With a VSL of $5 million
and a discount rate of 7%, the total benefits are estimated to equal
28
$1.1 billion.
In other words, with no changes in assumptions
concerning the effectiveness of food labeling in changing
consumption habits, the relationship between meat consumption and
fatal diseases, or the likelihood that industry will obey new
regulations, the estimated benefits can nonetheless increase more than
fivefold (or, from the other perspective, decrease by more than 80%)
depending on procedural choices made by an agency during the CBA
process. 29

24 Id. at 67,782 ("The benefits of this supplemental proposed rule would be the lives
saved due to the estimated reductions in mortality rates associated with coronary heart
disease and selected cancers.").
25 Id at 67,783 ("Decreases in intake of saturated fat, fat, and cholesterol will reduce
the incidence of heart disease and cancer, but not immediately-the reductions in illness
and death will begin to occur years into the future.").
26 Id. at 67,783-84.

27 See Bazelon & Smetters, supra note 13, at 278; Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit
Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1711-12 (2001) (noting "erratic" fluctuation
in discount rates used by federal agencies, with even the same agency adopting different
rates for different future costs and benefits "for no apparent reason").
28 Nutrition Labeling Rule, supra note 22, at 67,783-84.
29 References in CBA to ranges of VSLs and discount rates are quite common. See,
e.g., Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, Storage, and
Transportation, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,030, 33,055 (July 9, 2009) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts.
16, 118) (FDA: "The values in this column will vary depending upon the particular
estimates of the value of a statistical life (VSL) . . . and the discount rate."); Aircraft
Repair Station Security, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,874, 59,884 (Nov. 18, 2009) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R. pts. 1520, 1554) (TSA); Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle
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The FSIS regulatory impact analysis also illustrates another reason
that discounting of human lives plays such an important role when
regulations are under review. Even though FSIS believed that its
proposed meat-labeling rule would have benefits in addition to saving
human lives, those benefits were ignored when the agency quantified
the rule's estimated monetary benefits. 30 As a result, for purposes of
the CBA, the value of preventing a nonfatal cancer was zero.31
Similarly, in the regulatory impact analysis justifying a recent OSHA
regulation aimed at preventing crane accidents, "the Agency did not
estimate cost savings from avoiding crane accidents, but only
estimated monetized benefits for avoiding fatalities . . . or injuries." 3 2
Scholars have long criticized the tendency of agencies to ignore
entirely benefits they cannot easily quantify, 3 3 a problem particularly
acute when regulations have mostly noneconomic benefits such as the
protection of an endangered species with no obvious monetary value

Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74
Fed. Reg. 49,454, 49,460 (Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 86, 600) (EPA).
30 Nutrition Labeling Rule, supra note 22, at 67,782 ("Given questions concerning data
quality and unsettled methodological issues in estimating the benefits of a reduction in
non-fatal cases of coronary heart disease, FSIS is restricting its analysis of benefits to
reductions in premature death.").
31 The common practice of disregarding important (but difficult to calculate) benefits is
behind the decision to ignore all benefits other than prevention of fatal accidents in the
crossing guard example above. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also
Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165,
173 (1999) ("Although EPA estimated the benefits from reducing lead damage to
plumbing components, it did not include this estimate in the CBA published with the final
rule [concerning lead in drinking water]."); James K. Hammitt, Stratospheric-Ozone
Depletion, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT 131, 149

(Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997) (reporting the EPA's ignoring, in CBA for regulation
protecting stratospheric ozone, benefits of preventing certain skin cancers).
32 Cranes and Derricks in Construction, 75 Fed. Reg. 47,906, 48,095 (Aug. 9, 2010) (to
be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1926) ("These cost savings do not represent other losses
associated with accidents, such as production time lost to provide medical services to
injured employees, damage to cranes, damage to the work site or beyond, damage to the
load materials or rigging, lost time in cleaning up and repairing damage to the worksite,
lost production time while the crane is removed, repaired, or replaced with a substitute.").
33 E.g., William Funk, Public Participationand Transparency in Administrative LawThree Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 171, 182 (2009) (arguing that

the cost-benefit analysis process has elevated monetary costs over often intangible
benefits); see also David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L.

REv. 335, 398-99 (2006); Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV.
7, 58 (1998) ("neglecting 'soft' considerations like fairness, dignity, and intrinsic beauty
does bias the analysis against regulatory intervention").

HeinOnline -- 89 Or. L. Rev. 1322 2010-2011

2011]

Health Inflation, Wealth Inflation, and the DiscountingofHuman Life

1323

or the preservation of unspoiled wilderness. 34 Pervasive dismissal of
unquantifiable benefits may be explained by the tendency of courts to
deem arbitrary and capricious-and accordingly to strike downregulations justified by benefits with no numeric value. 35 Agencies
have limited time to devote to regulation, and if appellate judges have
no respect for unquantifiable benefits, agencies are wise to focus on
what works, irrespective of whether such judicial policy making is
36
appropriate. Whatever the reason for the outsized attention given to
benefits with dollar values, and in particular to lives saved, any
change in the procedure for assigning monetary values to human lives
has tremendous potential to affect the day-to-day ability of agencies
to respond to problems.
B. EthicalProblems with the Status Quo
In addition to practical concerns, to which this Article devotes most
of its attention, critics such as Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling
have attacked the discounting of future lives during CBA calculations
The simplest argument against discounting future
as unethical.
lives is that one should not value present persons above future
persons. As evidence for this moral claim, critics note that with a
positive discount rate, even enormous future benefits have minimal
present value. Imagine, for example, that scientists announce that one
thousand years from today, an asteroid will destroy the Earth, killing
everyone on it. Fear not, however. For $100, NASA can build an

34 See Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, The Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatoly
Movement, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 648, 655 (2002); see generally Amy Sinden, The
Economics ofEndangeredSpecies: Why Less Is More in the Economic Analysis of Critical
HabitatDesignations,28 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 129 (2004).
35 See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (vacating
EPA rule promulgated under the Toxic Substances Control Act that would have banned
most uses of asbestos); see also Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of
Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 541-49 (1997).
"The judges [in Corrosion Proof Fittings], in short, lacked the breadth and depth of
experience and expertise necessary to support such confident assertions about how the
agency should go about its assigned business. And they almost certainly got it wrong."
Id. at 547.
36 The decision in CorrosionProofFittings was particularly demoralizing to EPA staff.
See Jennifer L. Leonardi, It's Still Here! The ContinuingBattle over Asbestos in America,
16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 137-38 (2005) (recounting EPA staffers lamenting that asbestos
is "killing people and that the court ruling was not going to make that fact disappear").
The Department of Justice declined to appeal the Firth Circuit decision. Id. at 138.
37 See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 179-203 (2004).
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asteroid deflector, launch it into space, and redirect the giant rock
elsewhere, saving all humanity. The deflector must be launched
Let us consider the costs
immediately for the procedure to work.
and benefits of the project.
Costs: $100. Benefits: About nine billion human lives saved in one
thousandyears.
Do the benefits outweigh the costs? The economists say no. With
a world population of nine billion persons, each of whom is worth $7
million, the total benefits equal $6.3 x 1016. But these future
40
benefits must be discounted. With a discount rate of 3.5% per year,
the standard formula of
Present Value = Future Benefit / (+1 Discount Rate )vears
reveals that the value of saving nine billion lives in one thousand
years equals
($6.3* 1016) / 1.03500= $72.28
Seventy-two dollars, twenty-eight cents. If NASA devoted $100 to
this effort, it would waste nearly $28. A discount rate of 4% yields a
38 Although this scenario may strain credulity, societies often face the choice of acting
quickly or never. The passenger pigeon, once one of the most abundant birds in the world,
disappeared forever when the last bird died in the Cincinnati Zoo in 1914. See David
Wilcove, In Memory of Martha and Her Kind, 91 AUDUBON,

Sept. 1989, at 52.

Americans cannot correct the regulatory failure that allowed the extinction of the species.
In addition, some chemicals (such as dense nonaqueous phase liquids) have proven
impossible to fully remove from contaminated groundwater. See, e.g., OFFICE OF SOLID
WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSES, U.S. EPA, RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EPA
GROUND WATER TASK FORCE 23-25 (2007) (discussing sites where cleanup would be
wasteful or impossible because of "technical impracticability"); THE DNAPL
REMEDIATION CHALLENGE: IS THERE A CASE FOR SOURCE DEPLETION?, EPA/600/R-

03/143, at xiii (2003) (acknowledging that full remediation of certain sites is "unlikely").
39 These numbers are conservative; they likely overestimate the future monetary
benefits. See U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. -Affairs, World Populationto 2300 1, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/SER.A/236 (2004) (projecting a population around nine billion); Seth Borenstein,
An American Life Worth Less Today, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 10, 2008, available at

http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-07-10-796349025_x.htm (reporting that in
May 2008, EPA calculated a VSL of $6.9 million); Nutrition Labeling Rule, supra note
22, at 67,783 (discussing VSL of $5 million and noting that other agencies, such as the
Food and Drug Administration, use that figure).
40 This is another conservative number. Federal agencies often use much higher
discount rates, and higher discount rates yield smaller present values. E.g., Nutrition
Labeling Rule, supra note 22, at 67,773 (stating that the agency prepared estimates using
discount rates of 3% and 7%); see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4,
REGULATORY ANALYSIS 31, 34 (2003) ("For regulatory analysis, you should provide
estimates of net benefits using both 3 percent and 7 percent."); Revesz, supra note 5, at
977-78; see also supra note 11 (showing EPA's use of a 10% discount rate).
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total value of less than one dollar,4 1 and discount rates of 5% or
higher yield totals well below one cent. Little training in moral
philosophy is required to recognize that the economists have offered a
It is difficult to imagine a
monstrous definition of "value."
constructive dialogue concerning the proper use of tax dollars in
which one participant truly deems it wasteful to devote a penny (or
$100, for that matter) to saving the planet and all its inhabitants in the
distant future.
42
These arguments are not new, and the proponents of discounting
future lives have various answers for them.4 3 For now, I would like
to put aside the attacks on discounting future lives, at least those
attacks which challenge the foundation of CBA generally. It will
suffice to state that while the issue remains hotly debated, the moral
and ethical arguments appear to have little chance of changing the
actual calculations of costs and benefits conducted by federal
agencies. 44 When considering this Article's subsequent discussion of
how discount rates should properly be calculated in a regulatory
environment that insists on using them, it will be useful to recall that
if the ethical criticisms reviewed in this Part are justified, any practice
that tends to inflate the CBA discount rate is especially pernicious, for
it exacerbates the effects of an already lethal, immoral procedure.

41 Fifty-eight cents.
42 See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 357 (1984); Revesz, supra note 5, at
947 n.21 (and sources cited therein); see also Tyler Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the
Social Discount Rate, in JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 144, 145
(Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds., 1992) ("Imagine finding out that you, having just
reached your twenty-first birthday, must soon die of cancer because one evening Cleopatra
wanted an extra helping of dessert.").
43 E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Your Money or Your Life, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 15, 2004,

(reviewing
http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/your-money-or-your-life
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 37, and concluding that "we cannot rely entirely
on cost-benefit analysis, but we will do a lot better, morally as well as practically, with it
than without it"); see also Kysar, supra note 15, at 131 (collecting defenses of discounting
future lives).
44 Indeed, although Heinzerling has been appointed Senior Policy Counsel on climate
change for the EPA, agency regulations must go through the Office of Management and
Budget's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which is currently run by
Sunstein.
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II
WHY CBA DEFENDERS ARE WRONG ON THE NUMBERS EVEN IF
THEY ARE RIGHT ON THE ETHICS
Even if CBA, the monetization of human life, and the discounting
of future benefits are all taken as givens-if all moral objections are
tabled-the current practice of discounting future human life cannot
be justified even on a purely economic basis. Within the current CBA
discounting regime, the discount rate for future lives should be
radically reduced for two reasons. First, the inflation of health care
costs, which are increasing far faster than the price of other goods and
services, indicates that future generations will exhibit far greater
"willingness to pay" to avoid fatal risks than economists measure
today, meaning that the value of future lives-which is discounted to
find a present value-is currently underestimated by CBA
practitioners. Second, modem industrialized societies tend to increase
in wealth, meaning that even if health care does not increase as a
portion of the U.S. gross domestic product, future generations of
Americans will be richer than Americans are today, meaning they will
have more money to spend avoiding risk. These factors combine to
cause a massive undervaluation of future human lives, thereby
causing the underestimation of the benefits of environmental and
other regulation, which accordingly-even if the CBA proponents are
granted their primary premises-leads to needless deaths.45
A. Health Care Costs Inflate Fasterthan Costs ofNormal Goods
In recent years, rapid health care cost inflation has captured the
attention of American politicians and scholars.
CBA calculations,
however, have not considered health inflation when calculating the
value of future lives. Ignoring health inflation undervalues future
45 Inaccurate CBA calculations also prevent agencies from obeying executive orders
and statutes requiring that they maximize the "net benefits" of regulations. See infra Part
IV.B.3.
46 See President Barack Obama, Remarks to a Joint Session of Congress on Health Care
(Sept. 9, 2009) ("If we do nothing to slow these skyrocketing costs, we will eventually be
spending more on Medicare and Medicaid than every other government program
combined."); Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance and Deliberative Democracy in Health

Care, 97 GEO. LJ. 1, 9-10 (2008) ("After a pause in the mid-1990s, the sharp upward
spiral in costs has resumed."). Hereinafter, I will use "health inflation" as shorthand for
the increase of health care costs at rates higher than the rate of inflation measured for other
goods and services.
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lives no matter what discount rate is applied to future benefits.
Accordingly, regardless of whether agencies should use 3%, 7%,
10%, or some other number-or even if they should use no discount
rate at all, that is, a rate of 0/o-underestimating the future value of a
life saved will cause a CBA calculation to lowball the present value of
that future benefit.4 7
From 1960 to 2006, health care costs tripled as a portion of the
U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), rising from consuming 5.2% to
consuming 16% of GDP.4 8 Since 1980, health inflation has outpaced
general inflation on average by more than 3% annually.4 9 With
Americans devoting a greater percentage of their income to health
care, it would appear that their "willingness to pay" to avoid death is
rising. In other words, even in inflation-adjusted dollars, a future
American will likely exhibit a willingness to pay more money to
preserve his health (by, for example, avoiding a risk of death caused
by exposure to workplace contaminants) than Americans do today.
Assuming for the moment that health inflation will continue to
outpace general inflation by 3% annually over the coming decade,
then someone's willingness to pay in 2021 can be calculated as
follows:
WTP 2021 = WTP 2011 * 1.03 o

= WTP 2011 * 1.34
Accounting for health inflation increases the value of a 2021 life by
more than a third. Substituting a twenty-year time period increases
the value of a 2031 life by 81%. The resulting future value could then
be discounted to determine its present value. Note, however, that the
closer the discount rate is to the excess health inflation rate, the closer
the "real discount rate" for future lives comes to zero. For example, if
47 See supranote 40 (collecting various discount rates).
48 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2008 WITH
SPECIAL FEATURE ON THE HEALTH OF YOUNG ADULTS 412 tbl.124 (2008), available at

http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus08.pdf.
49 KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER

HEALTH BENEFITS: 2007 ANNUAL SURVEY 18-19 (2007), available at http://www.kff

.org/insurance/7672/upload/76723.pdf. While some of the increased health care costs are
attributable to waste-in the form of insurance company profits, medical billing overhead,
and the like-much of the rising costs reflect improved care. Drugs and devices, among
other forms of health care, have improved tremendously in recent decades. See Elizabeth
Arias, U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, United States Life Tables, 2006, 58
NAT'L VITAL STATS. REPS., June 28, 2010, at 1, 4 fig.1 (showing growth of life

expectancy for Americans between 1970 and 2006).
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the appropriate discount rate for future benefits is 3% per year, then
the above calculation yields this result:
Future Benefit = WTP 2011 * 1.03'r
Recalling that present value equals
Future Benefit / ( 1 + Discount Rate )Ye,
one next determines that
Present Value = ( WTP 201 1 * 1.03Ye-) / 1 .0 3Years
=

WTP 20 11

The result is that, with a 3% discount rate, the present value of a
human life, regardless of when in the future that life is saved,
becomes precisely equal to the value of a life saved today once one
accounts for health inflation. Of course, one could quibble about the
precise numbers selected, but the point is clear. As long as health
care costs are expected to inflate at a rate above general inflationand an increasing share of GDP devoted to health care seems widely
expected,5 0 if not universally applauded-then current CBA
calculations undervalue future lives at least somewhat. 5'
If one uses an annual discount rate of 7%, then the present value of
a life saved in ten years is worth about 51% of a present life,
according to current CBA practices. If health care inflation is
considered, that same life saved in ten years is worth about 68% of a
present life, meaning that accounting for health inflation increases the
so See, e.g., Henry J. Aaron & Isabel V. Sawhill, Bend the Revenue Curve: Health
Reform Alone Won't End Deficits, WASH. PosT, Oct. 13, 2009, http://www.washington

(supporting
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/12/AR2009101202389.html
Obama's health reform effort while acknowledging that, "as improved efficiency 'bends'
the curve, the best we will be able to do is slow the growth of health-care spending");
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH CARE SPENDING 9-10

(2007) ("In the absence of an unprecedented change in the long-term trends, national
spending on health care will grow substantially over the coming decades. . . . [T]he
excess cost growth rate for . .. spending on health care .. . in 2018 is assumed to equal the
average of the rates from 1975 to 2005 . . . ."); Sean Keehan et al., Health Spending
Projections Through 2017: The Baby-Boom Generation is Coming to Medicare, 27

HEALTH AFF. w145, w146 exhibit 1 (2008), available at http://www.cnbcasia.com/images
/documents/CMC%20Healthcare %20Study.PDF. "Over the projection period in this
paper (2007-2017), growth is anticipated to remain steady at around 6.7 percent per year
.....

Id. atwl45.

51 Because this argument rests on an assumption that health inflation will continue into
the future, it is obviously weakened by evidence that the phenomenon is waning. I believe
health inflation will be with us for some time but must acknowledge that my argument will
not persuade those who disagree with that presumption, perhaps correctly.
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present value of 2021 lives by about 34%. Accordingly, a proposed
regulation that seems too expensive under current CBA practices
might become a bargain when the benefits are recalculated. Because
human lives are often the only monetized benefits considered in a
CBA,52 the verdict on many lifesaving regulations might be
reversed. 5 3 Under our current system, in which an agency's expert
scientific analysis will be reviewed by generalist appellate judges who
may have no relevant scientific background, a procedural change that
credibly increases the expected benefits of a proposed regulation
should be especially welcome to agency staff eager to avoid seeing
years of work undone by the judiciary. 5 4
To be sure, the link between rising health care expenditures and
rising WTP-which if established would imply a link between rising
health care expenditures and rising VSLs-may not be obvious.
Health inflation justifies the inflation of future VSLs only if money
spent on health care somehow demonstrates a similar "willingness" to

52 See supranote 30 and accompanying text.
53 In practice, the "verdicts" at issue are mostly determined before the CBA is even
published, for regulators have little interest in publishing proposed regulations that will not
be enacted. Proper accounting for health inflation would decrease underregulation in two
ways. It would cause agencies to propose some regulations that otherwise might have
been shelved after initial internal agency calculation of costs and benefits, and it would
allow agencies to draft stronger versions (i.e., versions that cost regulated entities more) of
regulations already likely to be proposed and enacted. See Binyamin Appelbaum, As US.
Agencies Put More Value on a Life, Businesses Fret, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011,

(describing
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/business/economy/17regulation.html
promulgation of "stricter and more expensive" regulation after an agency upwardly
recalculated its VSL figure).
54 For an example of lay judges rejecting a sensible regulation and consequentially
dooming tens or hundreds of Americans to preventable cancer deaths, see Industrial Union
Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980), commonly known as

the "Benzene decision." In Benzene, the Supreme Court voted 5-4 to vacate an OSHA
regulation that would have lowered the permissible workplace benzene exposure from ten
parts per million (ppm) to one ppm, holding that the agency provided insufficient proof of
the expected benefits. Id. at 631 ("The evidence in the administrative record of adverse
effects of benzene exposure at 10 ppm is sketchy at best."). Seven years later, OSHA
promulgated an identical rule on the basis of additional scientific evidence. See William J.
Nicholson & Philip J. Landrigan, QuantitativeAssessment of Lives Lost Due to Delay in
the Regulation of OccupationalExposure to Benzene, 82 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 185, 187

(calculating, among other harms, "that 30 to 105 premature leukemia deaths will
eventually be caused by benzene exposures resulting from the delay in implementing a 1ppm standard between February 1978 and September 1987" and noting that the "number
of excess deaths" could exceed 1000); see also Benzene, 448 U.S. at 688 (Marshall, J.
dissenting) (correctly predicting that the "unfortunate consequence [of Benzene] is that the
Federal Government's efforts to protect American workers from cancer and other crippling
diseases may be substantially impaired").

HeinOnline -- 89 Or. L. Rev. 1329 2010-2011

1330

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89, L.313

trade money for longevity that economists assume exists when
calculating VSLs on the basis of wage premiums and similar
phenomena. And while the concept of a wage premium is fairly
straightforward, at least in the simple example provided above, the
economics of-health care could hardly be more complicated. Below
are but a few of the complications.
1. Agency
Health care expenditures often involve middlemen, creating
concerns about agency. Because the amount of money spent on a
person's health is often affected by insurance companies,56 by
government,s? and by patients' family members,ss rather than by the
person whose health is at issue, one might question whether money
spent on a particular patient's health reflects a true willingness of that
person to "pay" for longevity. Particularly when a patient pays no
can one really ascribe her
money at all for her health care,
consumption of health care services to a willingness to pay for them?
2. InternationalComparisons
During the debates over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 6 0 observers noted that the American health care system is
61
substantially less efficient than those of other industrialized nations.
55 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. In reality, determining a real-life wage
premium-an essential precondition to using such a premium to calculate a VSL-is beset
by confounding factors. How can economists, for example, determine how dangerous two
different jobs are? Assuming such information is available to researchers, is it available to
workers choosing among jobs? What about transaction costs associated with changing
jobs and acquiring safety information?
56 Whether a procedure is performed may depend on whether an insurance company
grants advance approval (i.e., agrees that the company will pay if the procedure is
performed).
57Even in a nation without "death panels," government actors affect health care
spending through mechanisms like Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement rates, the
approval process for drugs, and regulation of the health insurance business. Also, actions
taken by "the government" are themselves not easy to attribute to any particular personor even to a single branch of government.
58 Family members make health care decisions for, among others, children and much of
the elderly. Nonrelatives, such as guardians ad litem, act on behalf of additional patients.
59 Consider an indigent person who arrives at the emergency room, receives care, and
then pays nothing to the hospital.
60 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). This Act is the health care reform bill
signed by President Obama in March 2010.
61 See Maggie Fox, US. Scores Dead Last Again in Healthcare Study, REUTERS (July

23, 2010), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/23/us-usa-healthcare-last
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The Netherlands, Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom achieve
comparable results (as measured by the health of their populations)
62
while spending far less money than the United States. If health care
spending reflects willingness to pay and accordingly translates into
VSLs, the implication would be that Americans are willing to pay
more for their lives than are the citizens of countries boasting more
efficient health care systems. If true, then the life of an American
would be more "valuable" for purposes of CBA calculations than the
life of someone in the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, or the United
Kingdom. Perhaps such American exceptionalism is justified. If not,
however, the substitution of health care expenses for WTP becomes
problematic.
3. Ignorance
Even if we assume that a patient spends her own money on health,
chooses for herself what care to purchase, and participates in a
reasonably efficient health care marketplace-that is, if we ignore
agency problems and shelve concerns about international
comparisons-honest observers must recognize that health care
consumers lack information essential to evaluating the worth of
medical treatments. Even trained physicians cannot know of every
latest change in drugs, devices, procedures, and other care options,
much less the marginal utility of adopting one over another. And
while in theory a patient could educate herself extensively about her
options, such study costs time and money, causing a rational
participant in the health care market (should such a person exist) to
sensibly rely on the advice of health care professionals. In addition, a
patient otherwise inclined to devote substantial effort to selfeducation will likely defer to others upon having a sudden heart
attack.
Must we then reject health care expenses as a substitute for
"6willingness to pay" in the calculation of the value of statistical lives,
leaving us with wage premiums and similarly weak data?63 I think
-idUSTRE65MOSU20100623 ("Americans spend twice as much as residents of other
developed countries on healthcare, but get lower quality, less efficiency and have the least
equitable system.").
62 KAREN DAVIS ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, MIRROR ON THE WALL: How THE
PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM COMPARES INTERNATIONALLY, at v-

vii (2010), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Files/Publications
IFund%20Report/2010/Jun/1400 DavisMirrorMirroronthewall_2010.pdf.
63 See supra note 55.
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not. When considering VSLs, one must remember that the lives are
statistical, not real. When the Federal Railroad Administration
projects saving "the loss of . .. half of the value of a statistical life
each year," 6 4 readers understand that no "half person" will be saved
from a train crash because of the proposed FRA regulation. Although
some have criticized the common agency practice of adopting a single
65
VSL and using that number in all regulatory impact analyses, the
practice persists. When a coal miner's wage premium is used to
calculate a VSL, the result is not the value of the miner's life but
rather a number used for all Americans. Similarly, health care
expenses do not illuminate the "value" of any specific patient's lifenor the assessment of that value by her doctor, insurer, government,
or herself. Instead, just as the total outlays devoted to road
construction and maintenance demonstrate Americans' collective
interest in road building and repair, so do our total outlays on health
care demonstrate our collective interest in maintaining our health and
prolonging our lives. If one state spends more money per capita than
another on roads, observers could fairly conclude that, all other things
being equal, the higher-spending state values roads more than the
lower-spending state. Agency problems can obscure the value placed
on roads by any specific resident of either state, but the collective
valuation is made clear by collective action. Similarly, just as the
United States values military. equipment far more than any other
66
nation, the United States actually does value health care more than
67
If the United Kingdom enjoys greater
the United Kingdom does.
efficiency, its doctors and citizens should be proud of their thrift, but
the balance sheet is clear: Americans are willing to pay more. Do
Americans desire greater efficiency? Perhaps. Regardless, that
desired efficiency is not currently available to Americans, and we
have collectively decided to pay what we must to get the care we
want.

6 See supra text accompanying note 20.
65 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 7.
66
.Gerard O'Dwyer, World Military Spending Rose by 5.9% in '09: SIPRI, DEFENSE
NEWS (June 8, 2010), http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4661977 ("The United
States retained its position as the world's biggest spender, investing $661 billion on
military equipment in 2009. This represented 43 percent of the total global spend. . . .").
67 Again, this Article accepts the premises of CBA and the use of VSL, among which is
the principle that the value one places on something is equal to how much money one
spends on it.
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68

As noted above,
some uncertainty surrounds the future of
American health expenditures. Indeed, federal budget projections
vary tremendously depending on assumptions concerning future
health spending. 69 For purposes of CBA calculations, however, the
uncertainty is less significant because the time window is narrower.
While budget projections offer guesses many decades into the
70
future, CBAs created by regulatory agencies commonly estimate
costs and benefits over only ten or twenty years, a period in which
Accordingly, while a
health care expenses are more predictable.
critic might sensibly observe that health care cost inflation cannot
outpace general inflation forever-otherwise the entire economy will
one day consist of health care provision-a federal agency preparing
a regulatory impact analysis today need not worry about the expected
rate of health inflation in 2050. Instead, if health inflation is expected
to exist during the time period covered by the cost-benefit analysis
prepared for a particular proposed regulation, something almost
surely true for any regulation proposed in the coming decade, the
agency proposing the regulation should properly account for the
expected economic reality. 72
B. Human Lives in Rich Countries Improve over Time
Current CBA discounting further undervalues future lives because
discounters ignore rising per capita wealth in developed countries.
Because the "willingness to pay" for safety is at least somewhat
correlated with wealth, richer countries should use higher VSLs when
Yet, when valuing the lives of persons saved in
assessing policies.
68 See supranotes 50-51 and accompanying text.
69 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 27 (2010),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=l 1579&zzz=40884.
70 See id. at app. A (offering projections through 2080).
71 See id. at 28 ("CBO's projections of health care spending for the next few decades
probably provide more real information than its projections for the longer term.").
72 Agencies deciding to consider health inflation during CBA calculations today might
well reevaluate their decision a decade or two from now if the health care "cost curve" has
been "bent" sufficiently that health inflation is predicted to disappear. The prospect that a
policy appropriate today might require revision if conditions change in twenty years is not,
however, a good excuse for rejecting the proposed policy now.
73 Again, this Article attacks the economics of current CBA practices on their own
terms. A normative critique might well question whether the lives of the rich should count
more than those of the poor. E.g., DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 97-98 (1996) ("[P]references in costbenefit analysis are weighted with dollars, and the poor have fewer of these. Exactly those
people whom it seems policymakers should be most concerned to protect are those who
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the future, CBA calculators do not account for the growth of GDP in
excess of inflation and population growth.7 4 Developed countries,
such as the United States, see increases in real GDP (that is, GDP
adjusted for inflation) nearly every year.7 5 Indeed, a drop in real
76
Although part of increased GDP results
GDP causes great alarm.
from.population growth, the United. States has enjoyed rising real
GDP per capita for decades, 77 with an annual increase of about
1.8%.
Accordingly, the economic output of each American rises
over time, even in inflation-adjusted dollars.7 Gains in output are
divided among business profits, employee wages, and taxation,
meaning that almost every year, the average American sees a real
increase in the total money coming to her from profits (if, for

are most likely to be harmed." (citation omitted)); Robert H. Frank, Melding Sociology
and Economics: James Coleman's Foundations of Social Theory, 30 J. ECON.

LITERATURtE 147, 160 (1992) (agreeing that it "is probably true, as critics of cost-benefit
analysis complain, that the willingness-to-pay criterion systematically favors the interests
of the rich" and defending that practice on the ground that "the poor can be compensated
by simply lowering their tax rates").
74 For a pithy explanation of this neglect,.see James Kwak, Doing Discounting Wrong,
THE BASELINE SCENARIO (Feb. 16, 2010), http://baselinescenario.com/2010/02/16/doing
-discounting-wrong/ (criticizing CBA practices because "the real value of lives is
continually increasing").
75 See Real GDP, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/research
/directors charts/pi_9.pdf (last updated Mar. 25, 2011). GDP is defined as "the market
value of all the final goods produced in the entire country in the course of a year." PAUL
HEYNE ET AL., THE ECONOMIC WAY OF THINKING 352 (10th ed. 2002); see also National
Income and Product Accounts Table: Table 1. 1.5. Gross Domestic Product, BUREAU OF

ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, http://www.bea.gov/national
/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=5&ViewSeries=NO&Java=no&Request3Place
=N&3Place=N&FromView--YES&Freq=Year&FirstYear-1929&LastYear-2009&3Place
=N&Update=Update&JavaBox=no (last updated Apr. 28, 2011).
76 See, e.g., Marcus Walker, Record GDP Drop Sharpens Pain Across Euro Zone,
WALL ST. J., May 16, 2009, at A5.
77 See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF GDP
PER CAPITA AND PER EMPLOYED PERSON 12 tbl. 1 (2009), availableat http://www.bls.gov
/fls/flsgdp.pdf (showing that United States real GDP per capita nearly tripled between
1960 and 2008).
78 Id. at 13 tbl.2.
79 Increased per capita output is largely caused by increased productivity. See JOHN M.
ROBERTS, FED. RESERVE, ESTIMATES OF THE PRODUCTIVITY TREND USING TIMEVARYING PARAMETER TECHNIQUES (2000), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov
/pubs/feds/200f/200108/200108pap.pdf; Rafael Domdnech & Victor G6mez, Estimating
Potential Output, Core Inflation, and the NAIR U as Latent Variables, 24 J. BUS. & ECON.
STAT. 354 (2006); Productivity Change in the Nonfarm Business Sector, 1947-2010, U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., http://www.bis.gov/lpc/prodybar.htm (last modified Mar. 3,
2011) (showing annual productivity increases averaging above 2% since 1990).
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example, she owns shares in for-profit companies), pay, and
government outlays.so
Any calculation of a VSL that incorporates "willingness to pay" for
safety or "willingness to accept" risk will tend to place greater value
on persons with more disposable money. The reason is simple:
Willingness to pay for goods increases when one has money in the
first place (or at least has access to credit). Only someone with
money can exhibit willingness to part with it. Similarly, the toleration
of harms-such as dirty air or dangerous working conditions that a
government agency might regulate-in exchange for money should
increase with poverty. One does not hear news. accounts of bankers
selling kidneys. 82
A simple example illustrates the principle. If we assume an annual
increase in real per capita GDP of 1.8%,83 then for every $1000
80 Much depends on the definition of the "average" American. Regardless, the fruits of
increased output are going back into the economy one way or another, even if they are not
distributed in an equitable manner.
81 The society-wide existence of this phenomenon-that is, the tendency for richer
countries to spend more on clean air and other environmental benefits-is well
documented. For example, the "environmental Kuznets curve" illustrates a theory that, as
a country's economy grows, pollution increases, peaks, and then eventually decreases.
Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Economic Growth and the Environment, 110 Q.J.
EcON. 353, 370 (1995). The relationship of pollution to economic growth resembles the
"inverted U" of the original Kuznets curve, which concerns the relationship between
income distribution inequality and economic growth. See id. at 363; Simon Kuznets,
Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM. ECON. REv. 1, 18 (1955) (suggesting

that, as a country's economy develops over time, income inequality will rise, peak, and
then decrease). The upshot of the environmental Kuznets curve theory is that economic
growth does not inevitably result in degradation of the environment. Grossman &
Krueger, supra. Scholars have questioned, however, whether the theory holds up in an era
of global climate change. See, e.g., Jie He & Patrick Richard, Environmental Kuznets
Curvefor CO2 in Canada,69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1083, 1083-85 (2010).
82 Compare Larry Rohter, The Organ Trade: A Global Black Market; Tracking the Sale
ofa Kidney on a Path ofPoverty and Hope, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004, at Al (following

a kidney from Recife, Brazil, to Brooklyn), with Graham Bowley, With Big Profit,
Goldman Sees Big Payday Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2009, at Al ("Goldman . . .

announced that it had earmarked $11.4 billion so far this year to compensate its
workers.").
83 See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OuTLOOK 186 tbl.A17 (2010)

(predicting real GDP growth of 2.4% annually in advanced economies); Sewell Chan, No
Fed Plans to Give More Support, Bernanke Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2010, at BI ("The

Fed expects the economy to grow this year by 3 to 3.5 percent, picking up only slightly, to
3.5 to 4.5 percent, in 2011 and 2012."); Neil H. Buchanan, What Do We Owe Future
Generations?,77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1237, 1273 (2009) ("Even with the aging of Baby
Boomers, changes in productivity will apparently be more than sufficient to offset the
demographic changes and allow future GDP per capita to grow dramatically over the next
seventy-five years and perhaps beyond.").
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produced by each person in the United States today, each American in
ten years will produce $1195.84 When the increased output returns to
the economy in profits, wages, and government outlays, Americans
will have that much more real wealth to spend. All things being
equal, someone in 2021 would pay $1195 to avoid a risk that
someone would pay $1000 to avoid today. The "wealth-adjusted"
value of a 2021 benefit is therefore 19.5% greater than the same
benefit today, at least before discounting.
Much as the section concerning health inflation depends on the
assumption that health inflation will continue to exist,ss the argument
presented here concerning rising real GDP per capita will not
convince those who expect real GDP per capita to remain flat (or even
decrease) into the future. Again, I believe my assumption is a fair one
86
but recognize that rejection of the assumption vitiates my argument.
Next, one can apply discounting to these figures. If one ignores
increased future wealth and then imagines a future harm of the kind
Americans today would pay $1000 to ameliorate, the present value of
removing the futurie harm in 2021 is equal to
Future Benefit / ( 1 + Discount Rate )Year
which, with a discount rate of 7%,87 equals
$1000/( 1 + 0.07 )o= $508

8 The 2021 figure is in inflation-adjusted dollars, meaning that ten years from now
Americans will likely be about 20% more productive than today. Increased productivity is
made possible by technological advances that increase worker efficiency, increased hours
spent working, or some combination.
85 See supra note 51.
86 While theories such as "peak oil" or an inevitable "clash of civilizations" predict an

impending long-term drop in living standards, I take comfort in the record of past
doomsayers. See, e.g., THOMAS MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION

(1798) (predicting that British population could not grow beyond eighteenth century levels
without depressing the standard of living); PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB xi
(1968) (predicting that in "the 1970's . . . hundreds of millions of people are going to
starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked upon" and advocating "population
control [in the United States] hopefully through a system of incentives and penalties, but
by compulsion if voluntary methods fail"); see also WILLIAM FAULKNER, Nobel Prize
Address, in THE FAULKNER READER 3, 4 (1954) ("1 believe that man will not merely
endure: he will prevail.").
87 This example uses a discount rate of 7%, and the example in Part II.A used 3%.
Different rates have been chosen to reflect the multiple rates commonly provided in
agency CBAs. See supra note 40. Regardless of the discount rate chosen, future lives are
undervalued when agencies ignore health inflation and wealth inflation.
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If the future benefit is valued at $1195 instead of $1000-that is, if
the benefit calculation accounts for the increased wealth of future
Americans-then the value of removing the future harm in 2021 is
equal to
I + Discount Rate )Yas
Future Benefit (1
which, with a discount rate of 7%, equals
$1195 / ( 1 + 0.07 )'o = $607
The failure to use wealth-adjusted WTP and WTA figures when
calculating the future benefits of health and safety regulations thereby
leads to an undervaluation of about 16% for benefits obtained in
2021. For benefits accruing in twenty years, the undervaluation is
about 30%."
In addition, future Americans will likely devote at least part of
their extra income directly to risk reduction. One cannot predict with
any certainty what wealthier Americans will do with their additional
real dollars. If history is any guide, however, they will spend those
Absent good evidence that no
dollars on one thing or another.
increased wealth will cover safety costs, CBA calculators cannot
justify their inattention to future purchasing power. Especially as the
quality of safety technology improves-which seems nearly certain to
occur, at least for those who can afford it-it would be bizarre for
Americans enjoying unprecedented wealth to skimp on their own
safety.
Indeed, evidence abounds of Americans choosing to spend
increasing amounts of money on safety. Automobiles, for example,
come standard today with safety technology unavailable at any price
just a few decades ago.90 Child car seats, unknown to drivers of

88 The calculation is 1.018 to the twentieth power, which equals 1.43, meaning real per
capita U.S. GDP in 2031 is projected to be 1.43 times that of today. Removing this factor
when assessing future benefits causes an undervaluation of about 30%, calculated as
1 -(1/1.43)
89 See Martin Feldstein, The Return of Saving, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 87, 87 (2006) ("The

savings rate of American households has been declining for more than a decade and
recently turned negative."); Kathleen Pender, Personal Saving Rate Drops to Zero
Percent, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 7, 2005, http://articles.sfgate.com/2005-08-07/business
/17388187_1_stanford-institute-federal-reserve-data-economic-policy-research/2.
90 See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2010) (regulating, among other safety devices, mandatory
air bags); Key Dates in the History ofAutomobile Air Bags, USA TODAY, July 8, 1996, at
3B ("1971: Ford builds experimental air bag fleet"); see also RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT
ANY SPEED (1965).
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previous generations, are so commonplace as to be required by law. 9 1
Manufacturers offer particularly safe vehicles to buyers willing to pay
extra.92 These devices cost money, and Americans have decided to
pay for them. 93 Increased presence of safety equipment is of course
not limited to cars. The automatic external defibrillator present not
only on ambulances and in hospitals but also in a growing number of
restaurants and other public places was invented in the early 1970s.94
Users of bicycle helmets, ski equipment, and mountain climbing gear
enjoy substantially greater safety than was available in the recent past.
The same is true of purchasers of innumerable other products. Before
1972, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) did not even
exist.9 5 Current CPSC regulations cover 15,000 kinds of consumer
96
One may presume that such regulations would not be
products.
necessary if consumer product manufacturers were adopting the
mandated specifications absent legal compulsion, and the absence of
such voluntary adoption strongly suggests that the legal requirements
impose at least some costs on producers. Both through their
government and through individual purchasing choices, Americans
have demonstrated increased concern about risk over time-concern
that translates into increased willingness to pay for safety.
When one combines the effects of health inflation and wealthadjusted future WTP, the undervaluation of future benefits in current
CBA practice becomes especially stark. Using the 3%'figure from
above for excess health inflation (that is, the rate at which health care
costs increase above general inflation) and 1.8% for increased per

91E.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1229-c (McKinney 2010); see also 49 C.F.R. §
571.213 (2010).
92 See, e.g., INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, SHOPPING FOR A SAFER CAR 2011
(2011), available at http://www.iihs.org/brochures/pdf/sfsc.pdf. Consider the reputation of
Volvo, which sells expensive cars known for safety.
93 The decision to pay for mandatory items was made collectively. In general, however,
safety devices exist for some time-and are purchased voluntarily-before regulators
require their use.
94 See Pete Bysom, Retired Portland Physician Dies at 85, OREGONIAN, Aug. 28, 1993,

at D5.
95 See Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 4, 86 Stat. 1207, 1210 (1972) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §2053) (creating CPSC).
96 See Frequently Asked

Questions, U.S.

CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N,

http://vww.cpsc.gov/about/faq.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2011); 16 C.F.R. ch. 11 (2011)
(codifying regulations on products from cigarette lighters to pacifiers to swimming pool
slides).
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capita GDP," the future value of a benefit can be calculated as
follows: The future value of a benefit equals the value Americans
would assign to the same benefit available today, increased each year
by a factor of 1.03 and a factor of 1.018 . As an equation:
Benefitrato,

= Benefitpresent*

=

Benefitpresen

*

1.03yes . 1.0 1 8years
1.0 4 9yea1s

A benefit that would be worth $1000 today would therefore be
worth about $1606 to Americans able to obtain the benefit in 2021.
With an annual discount rate of 7%, the present value of the $1606
future benefit equals $816. If one instead calculated the present value
of receiving only $1000 in 2021, the result would be $508, an
undervaluation of about 38%. And if one uses a discount rate of
4.9%,99 then the discounting of future lives is completely
counteracted by the proper attention to health inflation and rising
wealth.
Unless CBA calculators can justify their failure to account for
health inflation and increasing per capita real GDP, they should
immediately begin increasing the future value of future health and
safety benefits. While controversy would remain as to what discount
rate is appropriate when determining the present value of such future
benefits, a CBA that correctly values future benefits will find more
.accurate present values for any correctly chosen discount rate, and
current practice arbitrarily reduces the values of future benefits.
C. Weaknesses
The brevity of this Article, along with its use of equations, may
obscure some weaknesses in its argument that deserve attention.1 00
Perhaps most important, the two factors identified as causing
97 Note that the figure of 1.8% is another conservative assumption. If we were to use
productivity instead of per capita real GDP, the annual increase would exceed 2%. See
supra note 79 and accompanying text.
98 The factors combine for an annual increase of about 4.9%.
9 Although this number is suggested to match the calculation above, it is not farfetched. Many scholars advocate using far lower rates. See, e.g., Kwak, supra note 74
(proposing a discount rate of 1%); see also INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON Soc. COST
OF CARBON, U.S. GOV'T, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCuMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON
FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, at 23 (2010)

("[W]e use three discount rates to span a plausible range of certainty-equivalent constant
discount rates: 2.5, 3, and 5 percent per year.").
1oo These weaknesses are in addition to the concerns raised supra notes 51, 83.
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overdiscounting of human lives as opposed to other future goodshealth inflation and rising per capita GDP-are related to one another
and are difficult to separate completely for purposes of analysis. For
example, perhaps health inflation is possible because of increased
wealth, and we see continued health inflation because a society that
has already covered many of its most basic needs can devote much of
any additional surplus to health care. 1' In addition, money spent on
health care is not precisely equal to money spent on health. If
administrative overhead is the cause of all (or even most) health
inflation,10 2 then increased spending is not as good an indicator of
willingness to pay to avoid risks of death. Further, some money spent
on health care is not strongly related to saving lives. The availability
of laser vision correction surgery may contribute to health inflation by
causing Americans to spend money on a procedure that previously did
not exist, but unless laser-corrected eyes prevent fatal accidents better
than old-fashioned eye glasses, paying for surgery does not indicate
much, if anything, about the patient's "willingness to pay" to avoid
fatal risks, which is the willingness used to calculate a VSL. 0 3
These critiques are fair, at least in part. While we cannot run an
experiment to determine if a parallel United States would have
experienced health inflation in recent decades even in the absence of
rising per capita wealth, it is likely true that at least some portion of
health inflation is attributable to rising wealth. If the "Great
Recession" were to deepen and endure for years, chances are that
health inflation would be checked if only out of necessity. 10 4
101In other words, one might argue that health inflation should be included among the
forms of safety technology discussed in Part IIB, such as safer cars. See Robert E. Hall &
Charles I. Jones, The Value of Life and the Rise in Health Spending, 122 Q.J. ECON. 39
(2007).
102 I cannot imagine that this is true-treatment options today seem so clearly superior
to those of the past, even the recent past-but I am neither a doctor nor a health economist
and will leave the dispute to others.
103 Cosmetic procedures such as Botox injections are another example of novel health
care expenses unrelated to preventing fatalities.
104 While the federal government can borrow at low rates, many states are prohibited by
their constitutions from deficit spending, meaning that when revenues fall (as they do
during recessions), expenses must drop, and health expenses of states and their political
subdivisions are no exception. See, e.g., Li Lou, Budget Cuts Squeeze Home Health Care
Workers, SAcRAMENTO BEE, July 26, 2009, http://www.sacbee.com/2009/07/26/2054581
/budget-cuts-squeeze-home-health.html; Editorial, Helping States Make Good Choices,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2009, at A20 ("Since a majority of state constitutions require
balanced budgets, the only alternatives are to raise taxes or cut spending. To cope, many
states are spending less on health care and education, which take up a large percentage of
most state budgets.").
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Because the amount of overlap between health inflation and wealth
inflation is something about which reasonable persons can disagree,
federal agencies might sensibly adopt different figures when deciding
how much to inflate future VSLs before discounting their monetary
worth to present value. Just as federal agencies choose varying
discount rates based on their own calculations and public policy
judgments, so too may they choose divergent VSL inflation rates.10 5
Even if every bit of health inflation were somehow attributable to
rising per capita wealth-an implausible assumption because at least
some health inflation must be caused by consumption of newly
available therapies10 6 -VSL inflation would nonetheless be justified
by the rate of wealth inflation.
A more sweeping critique might begin with the premise that
overregulation kills, and anything tending to decrease the apparent
benefits of proposed regulation serves to ameliorate the problem of
unduly burdensome regulation.10 7 For example, critics of the Food
and Drug Administration argue that the lengthy approval process for
drugs and devices causes needless deaths by denying patients
lifesaving cures. os And complaints of overregulation are common in

105 The appropriate VSL inflation rate should become a subject commonly addressed in
comments made to agencies that have proposed regulations. Regulated entities and other
advocacy groups have strong interests in seeing their preferred figures selected and will
therefore have incentives to justify their proposals in thoughtful submissions.
106 In a society with no real increase in wealth, residents would nonetheless spend more
on health care over time (by shifting consumption from other goods and services to health
care) unless no new drugs, devices, or techniques became available that are both expensive
and worth the price.
107 See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and
Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein,
Paradoxesof the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 407 (1990) (describing what

the author characterized as "self-defeating regulatory strategies-strategies that achieve an
end precisely opposite to the one intended, or to the only public-regarding justification that
can be brought forward in their support").
108 See, e.g., James L. Zelenay, Jr., The PrescriptionDrug User Fee Act: Is a Faster
Food and DrugAdministrationAlways a Better Food andDrugAdministration?, 60 FOOD

& DRUG L.J. 261, 273 & nn.109-10 (2005) (listing certain FDA delays that may have cost
tens of thousands of lives); Richard A. Deyo, Gaps, Tensions, and Conflicts in the FDA
Approval Process:Implicationsfor ClinicalPractice, 17 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 142,

146 (2004) ("[M]anufacturers argue that the agency drags its feet and kills people waiting
for new cures."). But see Gardiner Harris, Diabetes Drug Maker Hid Test Data, Files

Indicate,N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2010, at Al ("[D]ocuments demonstrate that the company
had data hinting at Avandia's extensive heart problems almost as soon as the drug was
introduced in 1999, and sought intensively to keep those risks from becoming public.").
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American political discourse. 0 9 Even advocates for workplace safety
occasionally object to regulations they believe will cost an
unreasonable number of jobs." 0 If the United States truly regulates
too much, however, the solution is not to create arbitrary errors in the
calculation of the costs and benefits of regulation. Instead, those
convinced that America suffers from surplus regulation instead of
insufficient concern for human life should advance their arguments on
the merits. Particularly in the context of cost-benefit analysis, which
already accepts the premise that human lives can be assigned a price
and that the price should be based upon factors such as wage
premiums that value rich persons above poor ones, stacking the deck
further with a systematic devaluation of human lives is not justified.
Another potential weakness concerns traditional economic
arguments about the marginal utility of money. Put simply, the more
money a person has, the less her position is improved by receiving an
additional dollar. The "utility" of the dollar decreases as the wealth
of the recipient increases. Accordingly, if-as is argued aboveAmericans are likely to become richer over time,"' then the marginal
utility of their money will decrease, implying that a higher discount
rate is appropriate.112 It is worth recalling, however, that VSLs are
calculated not on the basis of utility but instead on the basis of dollars.
In other words, when an economist determines someone's
"willingness to pay" for a reduction of risk, the WTP number reflects
109 E.g., 156 CONG. REC. S3,952-02 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (statement of Sen.
McConnell) ("The fact is, Washington can't even pay its bills. Yet over the last 16 months
it has taken over banks, insurance companies, car companies, the student loan business,
and health care. Now it has its sights set on anyone in America who engages in a financial
transaction."); Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, FCC Head Warns of Regulatory Excess, FIN.
TIMEs, Jan. 19, 2009, at 3 (quoting a Bush administration official warning the new
administration that, "with too much of an interventionist approach, you could actually
deter people from investing in the infrastructure").
110 See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 537 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc)
("[T]he intervening union argues, with some persuasiveness, that ill health effects resulting
from the prolonged unemployment of the head of the family on a closing of the Reserve
facility may be more certain than the harm from drinking Lake Superior water or breathing
Silver Bay air.").
IlI See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
112 See NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW

35 (2007) ("[I]f consumption grows, people are better off in the future than they are now
and an extra unit of consumption is generally taken to be worth less."). The theory is that
the present value of a dollar projected to be delivered in the future should be discounted to
reflect the minimal impact of that dollar on the wealthy recipient's utility. THE STERN
REVIEW eventually settles on a discount rate close to zero, largely for ethical reasons. Id.
at49-50,54.
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how much money is actually spent on, for example, safe cars. When
an economist determines someone's "willingness to accept" risk in
exchange for money, the WTA number reflects how much money is
actually paid as a "wage premium." These WTP and WTA figures
are then used to calculate the values of statistical lives. If anything,
the decreased marginal utility of future wealth should increase the
amount future Americans are willing to pay to avoid risk. The extra
money enjoyed by our rich descendants, who will already enjoy
material comforts greater than our own, can easily be diverted to
avoiding risks of early death. After all, what good is a big house or a
fancy car to someone not alive to enjoy them?'3
III
SOME ILLUSTRATIONS

Two illustrations should help to demonstrate the practical
importance of the proper calculations of regulatory benefits. The first
concerns potential regulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) under the
Clean Air Act. The second revisits the NASA asteroid deflector
discussed in Part II.B.
A. Regulation of GHGs in Response to Climate Change
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that greenhouse
gases are air pollutants covered by the Clean Air Act.l1 4 The EPA
was accordingly required to determine whether GHG emissions from
cars "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or

113 It may be true that a more rigorous calculation of the interests of future generations
would consider the marginal (as opposed to the total) amount of consumption across time
periods. See id. at 35-36 (quoting Robert M. Solow, The Economics of Resources or the

Resources ofEconomics, 64 AM. ECON. REV., May 1974, at 1, 9) (arguing that even if the
welfare of future generations is valued as highly as that of our own, we should "discount
future consumption if we expect[] the future to be richer than the present."). That said,
such criticisms apply also to the current calculation of VSLs based on WTP and WTA
data. For example, if a poor person is "willing to pay" only a small amount to avoid risk,
his WTP is small, but the marginal utility (to him) of the dollars he is willing to pay is
large. If agencies were to calculate "utility" rather than dollars during the CBA process,
regulations expected to help the poor (for example, by toughening air quality standards for
trash incinerators, which tend to be in poor neighborhoods) would suddenly seem more
cost-beneficial. For now, however, agencies seem focused on willingness to pay money,
not on the utility of the money one is willing to pay, and this Article operates under that
premise.
114 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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welfare" and, if so, what regulations are appropriate.s 15 Having
already issued an "endangerment finding" concluding that GHGs
116
the Agency has begun its
indeed pose a threat to public health,
regulatory response.' 17 The full extent of the EPA's response
remains uncertain, and any significant regulation is sure to be
challenged.1s
Accordingly, the EPA will face tremendous pressure-both from
outside groups and from employees eager to avoid wasting effort on
vacated regulations-to ensure that any climate change rules have
monetary benefits that exceed their costs. A federal Interagency
Working Group has already produced an estimate of the "social cost
of carbon (SCC)" emissions, "to allow agencies to incorporate the
social benefits of reducing carbon dioxide (C0 2) emissions into costbenefit analyses of regulatory actions that have small, or 'marginal,'
impacts on cumulative global emissions."11 9 Among the costs of
climate change-and, accordingly, the benefits of regulations that
combat climate change-are negative human health outcomes.12 As
is common in discussions of regulatory costs and benefits, the
Interagency Working Group discounted the present value of the social
11542 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) ("The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation prescribe ...
standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from .. . new motor vehicles or. .
. engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.").
116 See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I) ("The Administrator also finds that the combined emissions of
these greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle engines
contribute to the greenhouse gas air pollution that endangers public health and welfare
under CAA section 202(a).").
117 See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at
49 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600) (promulgating, along with National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, regulations on GHG emissions from passenger cars, pickup trucks, sportutility vehicles, minivans, and passenger vans).
118 See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Senate Rejects Republican Effort to Thwart Carbon Limits,

N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 2010, at A22 ("The Senate voted 53-47 to reject an attempt by
Senator Lisa Murkowski, Republican of Alaska, to block the E.P.A. from imposing new
limits on carbon emissions based on its 2009 finding that such gases from industry,
vehicles and other sources represent a threat to human health and the environment.");
Jenna Greene, Air Assault: 38 Suits Filed over New Greenhouse Gas Rules, NAT'L L.J.,

June 14, 2010, at 1.
119 INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON Soc. COST OF CARBON, supra note 99, at 1.

120 Id. (stating that the SCC estimate "is intended to include (but is not limited to)
changes in net agricultural productivity, human health, property damages from increased
flood risk, and the value of ecbsystem services due to climate change").
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cost of carbon emitted in the future.121 The report contains a fairly
robust discussion of discounting, noting the particular problems that
arise when one discounts benefits expected to accrue to future
generations.122 The discussion concludes, "In light of disagreement
in the literature on the appropriate market interest rate to use in this
context and uncertainty about how interest rates may change over
time, we use three discount rates to span a plausible range of
certainty-equivalent constant discount rates: 2.5, 3, and 5% per
year." 12 3 The Working Group has rejected the commonly employed
discount rate of 7%, but even the lowest annual discount rate
proposed, 2.5%, will vastly decrease the present value of many
benefits associated with preventing severe anthropogenic climate
change.
Consider the effects of various discount rates on benefits predicted
to arrive twenty years in the future. For benefits whose future value is
$100 million, the present value is displayed below.124
Table 1. Valuation of benefits twenty years in the future
Discount Rate

0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

2.5%

3.0%

5.0%

Present Value
(in millions)

$100

$81.95

$67.30

$61.03

$55.37

$37.69

In short, the effect is tremendous. A discount rate of 2% cuts the
present value by about one-third. Increasing the discount rate to
2.5%-the lowest rate used by the Working Group-reduces present
value of the $100 million by almost two-fifths. And so on along the
table.
The effect on more distant benefits is even more severe. The
following table displays the present value of benefits expected to
arrive in fifty years, with a future value of $100 million.

121 Or, from the other perspective, the Working Group discounted the benefits of
preventing such emissions.
122 INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON Soc. COST OF CARBON, supra note 99, at 17.
123 Id. at 23.
124 Again, the formula is
Present Value = Future Benefit / (1 + Discount Rate )Y-
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Table 2. Valuation of benefits fifty years in the future
Discount Rate

0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

2.5%

3.0%

5.0%

Present Value
(in millions)

$100

$60.80

$37.15

$29.09

$22.81

$8.72

The 5% annual discount rate destroys more than 90% of the present
value. Even the 2.5% rate destroys more than three-fifths of the
present value.
For any proposed climate change regulation, at least some of the
expected benefits should come in improved human health and saved
lives. If regulators continue to discount human health and lives as
they do dollars, the true present value of these future benefits will be
vastly understated, leading to an inadequate response to a colossal
environmental peril. Agencies preparing regulatory impact analyses
for climate change rules should properly account for the increased
value of human life and health in the future. By recognizing that
according to the economic assumptions underlying CBA, future
American VSLs should be greater than those measured today,
regulators can increase their estimates of the expected future benefits
of proposed rules. The increased future benefits, regardless of the
discount rate chosen, will have greater present values than would
benefits calculated with no consideration of health inflation and
increased wealth.
B. Revisiting the NASA Asteroid Deflector
Earlier, the power of discounting was demonstrated by an
illustration of how economists might deem it wasteful to spend one
hundred dollars today to save the entire planet in one thousand
years.125 The table below shows the present value of saving the Earth
under a few different sets of assumptions. The left column displays

125See supra Part II.B. The standard formula of
Present Value = Future Benefit / ( 1 + Discount Rate )'
reveals that with a discount rate of 3.5%, the value of saving nine billion lives in one
thousand years equals
( $6.3 x 1016) / ( 1.035l0) = $72.28
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discount rates, and the top row displays a factor used to increase the
future value of human lives.1 2 6
Table 3. Accounting for increased VSLs in the future: present dollar value (in 2011) of
saving the Earth in 3011
0.0%
increase

1.0%
increase

2.0%
increase

3.0%
increase

4.0%
increase

5.0%
increase

0.0%
discount

6.30 x
1016

1.32 x
1021

2.51 x
1025

4.33 x
i029

6.80 x
10"

9.74 x
10'

2.0%
discount

158
million

3.32 x
1012

6.30 x
106

1.09 x

1.71 x

2.45 x

1021

1025

1029

3.5%
discount

72.28

1.51
million

2.88 x

4.97 x

7.80 x

10o

10'

10'1

1.12 x
1023

5.0%
discount

less than
one cent

85 cents

16,226

280
million

4.40 x
1012

6.30 x
1016

The bottom row of Table 3, which uses a 5.0% discount rate (the
highest suggested by the cost of carbon working group), shows that
VSL inflation of even a few percent per year completely changes the
cost-benefit figures for the NASA proposal. Similar effects are seen
with other discount rates. Instead of discovering that spending one
hundred dollars is wasteful-as is seen with a 3.5% discount rate and
zero VSL inflation-with a 5.0% discount rate and a 3.0% VSL
inflation figure, the benefits of deflecting the asteroid have a present
value of $280 million. Increasing the VSL inflation figure to 4.0%

126 The VSL inflation figures in the top row of the table represent the product of
expected health inflation and expected real growth in GDP per capita. For example, with
expected health inflation of 1% and expected real GDP per capita growth of 2%, the result
would be
1.01 * 1.02 = 1.03
or a 3% annual increase in VSL. As is discussed above, these figures are difficult to
estimate with precision, but I expect they are almost certainly positive, and a product of
5% seems well within the range of plausible figures.
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yields a present value of about $4.4 trillion. 12 7 And because a VSL of
5.0% would precisely equal the discount rate for the bottom row, the
final figure on the table displays a present value of $6.30 x 1016, a
value reflecting an effective discount rate of zero.
While it is of course impossible to set a price on the salvation of
the planet and all of its inhabitants, I believe that the further one
moves to the right on the table, the more reasonable the numbers
should seem.128 Absent VSL inflation, even fairly low discount rates
eviscerate the present value of saving the world in 3011. Including
VSL inflation eliminates one of the more preposterous results of the
mechanical application of common CBA techniques, and it brings the
results of economic calculations closer to those suggested by ethical
intuition.

IV
FURTHER THOUGHTS ON COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

If the theories presented in this Article are correct-that is, (1)
CBA calculations ignore health inflation and wealth inflation, (2) they
accordingly fail to inflate the value of future statistical lives before
discounting them to present value, and (3) as a result, federal agencies
systematically undervalue human lives predicted to be saved in the
future by proposed regulations-then so what? I offer two answers,
the first immediate and practical, and the second more theoretical.
A. Immediate Implications
Readers persuaded by this Article will recognize that until federal
agencies reform their CBA processes, Americans will die needlessly,
largely because regulated entities will be spared the imposition of
regulations authorized by statute and justified by appropriate
calculation of costs and benefits. For the workers who will inhale
carcinogens if OSHA fails to lower the permissible workplace
exposure, for the municipal water drinkers who will swallow poison if

127 This figure is in the neighborhood of the entire annual budget of the U.S.
government. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, A NEW ERA OF RESPONSBILITY:

RENEWING AMERICA'S PROMISE 114 tbl.S-1 (2009) (President's proposed budget for
fiscal year 2010).
128 I recognize that my moral intuition on the proper value cannot be proven accurate. I
doubt, however, that many proponents of current CBA practices truly wish to defend the
valuations at the bottom left of the table.
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the EPA fails to set a maximum contaminant level,129 for the children
whose toys the CPSC may or may not regulate, cost-benefit
calculations are no theoretical matter. Fortunately, the current
administration has already indicated a desire to reconsider the CBA
process, and President Obama has ordered the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) to produce, along with federal regulatory
for a new Executive Order on
agencies, "a set of recommendations
1 30
Federal regulatory review."
A revised executive order could improve CBA calculations across
the federal government. Short of a presidential directive that the ideas
of this Article be adopted, the OMB recommendations could suggest
that agencies consider incorporating VSL inflation into their CBA
calculation process, allowing agencies, regulated entities, and activists
to begin a dialogue in search of the appropriate VSL inflation
figure.131 In addition, agencies should consider unilateral adoption of
improved procedures rather thar awaiting explicit direction from
OMB or the President. Every time an agency seeks comment on a
proposed regulation whose benefits include saving human lives in the
future, supporters of the regulation can supplement the agency record
by submitting comments urging the use of VSL inflation during the
preparation of the final regulatory impact analysis (RIA). RIAs
could inform the
including these improved procedures
administration's ongoing deliberations.
The practical effect of considering health inflation and wealth
inflation during the CBA process-that is, of inflating the value of
future statistical lives-would be a lower effective discount rate for
human life. In other words, whatever discount rate an agency uses to
discount future costs and benefits to their present value, future human
lives would be discounted at a lower annual rate. Using equations,
the present value of future life equals
Future VSL / (+1 discount rate )years

129See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1.
130 See Regulatory Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 5977, 5977 (Jan. 30, 2009) (memorandum
from the President to "Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies" requesting
"suggestions on the role ofcost-benefit analysis").
131Instead of a single figure, agencies might adopt principles to guide future
calculations, including identification of trustworthy sources of health inflation and wealth
inflation data and methods of determining to what extent these phenomena overlap, if at
all.
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Because the future VSL is equal to
Present VSL (1 + inflation factor )Yea
the present value of a future life equals
1 + discount rate
Present VSL * (1 + inflation factor)yeam / (Y

years

which equals
Present VSL * ((1 + inflation factor ) / (1 + discount rate ) )Year
An agency can determine the appropriate discount rate for future
human lives by dividing the VSL inflation factor (based on the
agency's predictions of health inflation and wealth inflation) by the
discount rate used for normal costs and benefits, and then subtracting
the result from 1.132 If, for example, an agency uses a discount rate of
5%, and health inflation and wealth inflation justify VSL inflation of
4% per year, then the effective discount rate for future human lives
expected to be saved by proposed regulations would be about 1%.133
With agencies commonly using discount rates of 3% and 7% during
their CBA processes, even extremely conservative estimates of health
inflation and wealth inflation would halve the effective discount rate
for human life.13 4 By adopting this simple procedural change,
agencies can immediately cease their pervasive underestimation of the
benefits of proposed regulations, which would reduce the fatal
underregulation that kills Americans every year.

In other words, the discount rate for human life equals
1 - ( VSL inflation rate / discount rate)
If the VSL inflation rate is the same as the discount rate for normal costs and benefits, the
discount rate for life would equal zero because
1 - ( VSL inflation rate / normal discount rate)
would become
I -(x/x)
with x representing the identical rate.
133 The precise discount rate would be
1 - ( 1.04 / 1.05)
or about 0.95%.
132

134 Starting with some of the discount rates proposed by INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP.

ON Soc. COST OF CARBON, supra note 99, conservative estimates of health inflation and
wealth inflation might bring the effective discount rate for human life to zero. Note that if
the VSL inflation rate were higher than the discount rate for normal costs and benefits, this
formula would yield a negative discount rate for human life, meaning that future lives
would be valued above present ones. I recommend that agencies set zero as their
minimum discount rate rather than using a negative rate.
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B. Stepping Back
Persuaded readers might also consider the implications of this
Article's premises on CBA more generally. Although I have
attempted to rebut the pro-CBA consensus on its own terms, I will not
insult readers by pretending to have no opinion on the ongoing
debate.13 5 A few conclusions follow if the central premises of this
Article are accepted.
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis FiguresResemble Wild Guesses
With federal agencies using discount rates from 0 to 10%, and with
there being no apparent justification for an agency's choice of
discount rates, 1 the estimated costs and benefits of a proposed
regulation can fluctuate wildly based on arbitrary procedural
If these estimates have undercounted benefits
calculations.13 7
because of a widespread failure to account for health inflation and
wealth inflation, an already capricious process becomes increasingly
detached from reality. To be sure, agencies would benefit from
accurate predictions of costs and benefits of proposed regulations.
But if the estimated benefits can vary by 25, 50, or 90% because of
accounting choices,' 3 8 then agencies are presented with nearly
random figures instead of anything accurate.1
The possibility that a mechanical application of CBA principles
might yield a negative discount rate for some future costs and
benefits, 14 0 requiring that agencies value future Americans above
135 See supra notes 37, 42-44 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 27 and accompanying text; see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
& DEV., REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: A TOOL FOR POLICY COHERENCE 38-39'
(2009) (cataloguing wide divergence in discount rates used across the world, including
4.5% in the European Community, 7.5 to 12% in Canada, and 6% in Denmark).
137 For an illustration of the power of small changes to discount rates, see supra Part
IV.A. Net benefits will also fluctuate substantially depending on an agency's choice of
VSL, another decision about which there is little consensus. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 136, at 36-37 (noting that primary Canadian and
American guidance documents suggest VSLs in the range of $1 million to $10 million,
allowing fluctuation by an order of magnitude).
138 See Yang Wang, Now, Later, or Never: Applying Asymmetric Discount Rates in
Nuisance Remedies and Federal Regulations, 105 MICH. L. REV. 2035, 2038 (2007)
(noting "that even a minute discrepancy in the estimated discount rate can" drastically
change the desirability of a proposed regulation).
139 Recall that even before any monetization or discounting of life occurs, CBA already
involves numerous estimates that build uncertainty into the process. See supra notes 2229 and accompanying text (discussing estimates related to food-labeling regulation).
140 See supra note 134.
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those living today (instead of as equals, which critics of discounting
life advocate, or as less valuable than current Americans, which the
status quo CBA practice deems them to be) further illustrates the
questionable assumptions imbedded in current practice. Debates
about intergenerational equity and the duty owed by present
governments to future citizens raise complex questions concerning
ethics, human behavior, and science.14
When agency heads,
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, delegate to
number crunchers the question of how Americans today should value
our expected descendants, they artificially convert policy questions
into math problems. It may be sound to discount future Americans at
some annual rate, or the practice may be unethical. The answer is not
available on any spreadsheet. Converting guesses into numbers
cloaks uncertainty with the appearance of rigor and provides no real
answer to the question justifying the exercise of CBA in the first
place: Is this proposed regulation worth enacting?1 4 2
2. These Guesses Systematically Harm Americans and Their
Environment
As explained more fully above,14 3 accounting for health inflation
and wealth inflation would sharply reduce the effective discount rate
for future human lives, potentially reducing the effective rate to zero.
Today, however, agencies do not account for health inflation and
wealth inflation, meaning that across the federal government, every
single exercise in cost-benefit analysis undervalues the lives of
141For example, whether the world should respond to climate change soon or instead
should avoid carbon emission reductions that might slow economic growth, thereby
having greater resources to tackle the problem later, depends on-among other things--{l)
how technology is likely to develop, (2) whether certain "tipping points" make adverse
consequences of climate change irreversible, and (3) whether doctrines like the
"precautionary principle" mandate prompt action despite uncertainty.
142For example, economists can predict the future price of emissions credits under a
"cap and trade" regime. See Olivier Durand-Lasserve, Axel Pierru & Yves Smeers,
Uncertain Long-Run Emissions Targets, CO 2 Price and Global Energy Transition: A
General Equilibrium Approach, 38 ENERGY POL'Y 5108, 5113-18 (2010) (predicting that

in regions where banking emissions permits is possible, the prices of the permits are
predicted to follow the "Hotelling rule"); Harold Hotelling, The Economics ofExhaustible
Resources, 39 J. POL. ECON. 137, 139-41 (1931) (concluding that, under certain
conditions, the price of a nonrenewable resource will vary according to the rate of
interest); see also Shantayanan Devarajan & Anthony C. Fisher, Hotelling's "Economics
of Exhaustible Resources": Fifty Years Later, 19 J. ECON. LITERATURE 65, 66 (1981).
Economists cannot, however, tell us how much we should care about our grandchildren's
quality of life.
143 See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
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Americans whom proposed regulations are designed to protect.
Where regulations would protect the environment-bringing aesthetic
benefits along with improvements to human health that accompany a
cleaner environment-the undervaluation of future human lives
systematically devalues environmental protection. Several statutes
empower (and require) agencies to protect the environment with the
explicit purpose of safeguarding human health,'" and current CBA
procedures impede that work every time an agency seeks to fulfill its
duties by promulgating regulation. In particular, statutes that invite or
require a balancing of costs and benefits-for example, by mandating
safety "to the extent feasible" or by stating that an agency shall
prevent "unreasonable" risks-are thwarted when agencies employ
procedures that devalue expected benefits.
Accordingly, critics who have complained that CBA calculations
improperly ignore benefits lacking obvious economic value, often
treating as worthless those benefits officials cannot easily quantify,14 5
were more correct than they realized. Current CBA procedures not
only ignore a host of important benefits but also devalue the
remaining benefits assigned a monetary value. For example, after
ignoring certain skin cancers altogether when calculating the benefits
of saving the ozone layer, the EPA then overdiscounted the benefits
of preventing fatal cancers.146 Incidental benefits-those benefits
identified in a regulatory impact analysis but left out of the numerical
table-are provided only to the extent the quantified benefits suffice
to justify enactment of a regulation. When the monetized benefits are
devalued across the board, the inchoate benefits disappear also.
3. Systemic Inaccuracy May Violate Legal Mandates
Executive Order (EO) 12,866, which requires agencies to produce
CBAs and for the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs

144 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (Toxic Substances Control Act provision requiring the
EPA Administrator to regulate chemicals presenting "an unreasonable risk of injury to
health or the environment"); 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (Occupational Safety and Health Act
provision requiring the Secretary of Labor to ensure, to the extent feasible, "that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity" because of
toxic workplace conditions); 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (Clean Air Act provision requiring
control of emissions that "cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare"). Other relevant statutes include the Safe
Drinking Water Act and the Clean Water Act.
145 See supra notes 31-33.
146 Id.
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(OIRA) to review them,14 7 states that "agencies should select those
approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages;
distributive impacts; and equity), unless a statute requires another
If agencies are systematically
regulatory approach." 4 8
undercounting the benefits of proposed regulation, then they almost
surely are not promulgating regulations that "maximize net benefits"
and accordingly are violating EO 12,866. The OIRA could rectify
this widespread pattern of violation by "returning" draft regulations to
agencies with instructions to consider health inflation and wealth
inflation. The White House describes OIRA's review as follows:
In some cases, when OMB believes that an agency rule is not
consistent with the principles set forth in Executive Order 12866,
OIRA "returns" the rule to the agency for further consideration.
"Returning" a rule means that OIRA has concluded that the draft is
not consistent with the principles of Executive Order 12866 and that
further agency effort is needed before the agency may publish the
rule. For example, the ageqc may have provided inadequate
analysis regarding alternatives.
Near universal undercounting of benefits is "not consistent with the
principles of' EO 12,866, and procedural choices causing systemic
underprotection of health and the environment by definition yield
"inadequate analysis regarding alternatives."
In addition, even without any executive orders concerning CBA,
agencies are required by multiple federal statutes to seek accurate
assessments of the costs and benefits of regulation. 5 0 Certain
147 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601; see also
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB MEMORANDUM
M-09-13, GUIDANCE FOR REGULATORY REVIEW (2009) ("On January 30, 2009, the

President issued Executive Order 13497, revoking the previous Administration's
amendments to Executive Order 12866, which governs centralized review of significant
agency actions by [OIRA]. Revocation of these amendments restored the regulatory
review process to what it had been under Executive Order 12866 between 1993 and
2007.").
148 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1.
149See Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) Q&A's, OFFICE OF MGMT.

& BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/OIRAQsandAs/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2011)
(describing OIRA review of draft regulations).
150 The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 604, and the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act both require cost-benefit analysis in certain contexts. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a)(2)
(requiring "a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the anticipated costs and benefits
of [proposed federal mandates]"); see also supra note 144 (listing provisions requiring
agencies to act "to the extent feasible" and to eliminate "unreasonable risks," both
standards necessitating accurate assessments of costs and benefits).
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statutes provide for judicial review of whether agencies have
Other actions by
complied with these procedural requirements.
regulatory agencies, such as the issuance of permits and waivers, also
involve considerations of costs and benefits required by statutes.152
Here too, pervasive undercounting of benefits prevents agencies from
obeying statutory mandates.
CONCLUSION

The two simple corrections to CBA calculations proposed in this
Article would immensely increase the monetized benefits of
regulations expected to save lives in the future. By accounting for
health inflation and rising wealth, policy makers can more easily
justify regulations concerning workplace safety, clean air, clean
water, and highway safety, to name just a few. In particular, the longterm benefits of ameliorating global warming would have
substantially greater monetary value if properly calculated. Without
silencing their ethical and moral critiques of discounting future
human lives, those opposed to the practice should demand that if
CBA calculations will incorporate such discounting, they must at least
begin with a proper assessment of the future value to be discounted, a
value one can accurately find only with a consideration of health care
cost inflation and rising per capita wealth.

151 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 611 (allowing judicial review of agency compliance with the
Regulatory Flexibility Act).
152See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(m)(1)(B) (allowing the issuance of a permit under the
Clean Water Act when the costs of strict application of other CWA provisions would
"exceed by an unreasonable amount the benefits to be obtained").
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